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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE RIGHT: LESSONS
FROM THE TEA PARTY
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT†
INTRODUCTION
Within the legal academy over the past decade or so, popular constitutionalism has emerged as an important and often quite controversial
theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of constitutional
development.1 In its strongest and most provocative form, popular constitutionalism demands that the American people play a central role in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution, and that the courts should, to
one degree or another, defer to the legitimate constitutional claims of the
people and their elected representatives. The Supreme Court is not (or
should not be) the final arbiter of constitutional meaning.2 Ordinary citizens should regularly engage with their Constitution, and they should do
so not just in some abstract sense, but in an immediate and active way.3
Popular constitutionalism, in short, is based on the belief that responsibility for shaping the meaning of the Constitution is not just the province of
the courts; it is also a basic duty of the people themselves.
History provides a rich canvas for exploring the record and potential
of popular constitutionalism. Much of the work produced by scholars of
popular constitutionalism has been efforts to excavate past moments of
popular mobilization around constitutional claims. They have examined
episodes of U.S. history, identifying ways in which popular demands
made upon constitutional text and principles resulted in shifts in general

† Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty Fellow, American Bar Foundation. For helpful comments, criticisms, and discussions, I thank Kathy Baker, Chris Buccafusco,
Sarah Harding, Mark Rosen, as well as participants in the University of Colorado Law School’s
Rothgerber Conference, and the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop.
1. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 960 (2004) (describing the popular constitutionalism as an “emerging new discourse” within the
legal academy); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 2047, 2048 n.1 (2010) (citing sources describing popularity of popular constitutionalism
among legal academics).
2. This normatively oriented version of popular constitutionalism is found most prominently
in the work of Larry Kramer. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND J UDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court
2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (2001); see also, e.g., MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 959 (“In a system of popular constitutionalism, the role of the
people is not confined to occasional acts of constitution making, but includes active and ongoing
control over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law.”).
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assumptions and expectations about the Constitution.4 This, in turn, pressured those in positions of official authority—most notably but not exclusively judges—toward new interpretations of the Constitution. Popular constitutionalism thus offers a response to the tension inherent in democratic constitutionalism: between a commitment to popular sovereignty and a commitment to constitutionally entrenched norms that stand
above majoritarian decision-making. Through this dynamic of constitutional responsiveness, both the Constitution and the courts benefit. A
constitutional system that is responsive to the constitutional commitments of the people serves a crucial legitimating function.5
While American history reveals a robust tradition of popular constitutional engagement, popular constitutionalists generally see developments of recent years as reasons for concern. Larry Kramer, whose book
The People Themselves is the single most prominent contribution to the
field of popular constitutionalism, laments that Americans no longer take
seriously their responsibility as interpreters of the Constitution.6 The
people have become too deferential to the courts; they have lost a sense
of authority over their founding document.7 In accepting judicial claims
of primacy over interpreting the Constitution, the people themselves have
abdicated a basic duty of constitutional citizenship.8
The modern judiciary—particularly the Supreme Court of recent
years—is also to blame for the decline of popular constitutional engagement. Advocates of popular constitutionalism have attacked the Court’s
efforts to assert a preeminent, even exclusive role in defining the meaning of the Constitution for all of American society.9 By Kramer’s ac4. The bulk of Kramer’s book is a close reading of the practice of extrajudicial constitution
claim-making and judicial review in the early republic. KRAMER, supra note 2 passim; see also Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927
(2006); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitution in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark
Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in
Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-K ENT L. REV. 967 (2006); William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All”, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987); Robert
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1027 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]; Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection]; Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
5. On this point, the work of Post and Siegel is essential. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
6. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 227-48.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Recent cases in which the Court has emphasized its exclusive interpretive supremacy on
questions of constitutional interpretation include Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 428
(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 524 (1997); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 (1992) (“Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever
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count, the Court’s repeated claims that it is supreme in defining the
meaning of the Constitution, coupled with widespread popular acceptance of these claims, from both left and right, caused “popular constitutionalism [to] fade[] from view” in the post-New Deal period.10 Popular
constitutionalists have called for increased popular engagement with the
nation’s founding document as an antidote to the problem of judicial
supremacy.11
As if made to order, we are today witnessing in the Tea Party a political movement that has, to an extent unprecedented in modern American history, placed the Constitution at the center of its reform agenda.
This movement has done so with remarkably little concern for the courts
and judicial interpretations of the Constitution. As I explain below, Tea
Party constitutionalism is premised on a belief that citizens have a responsibility to read their Constitution, to stake out claims about its meaning, and to demand that public officials act in accordance with these
claims. The Tea Party, it would seem, is precisely the kind of popular
assertion of responsibility over the Constitution that popular constitutionalists had been calling for.
But the Tea Party has hardly been embraced by advocates of popular constitutionalism. The reason is not hard to discern. Although as a
formal matter, the theory of popular constitutionalism has no ideological
or partisan valence, it has for the most part been advocated by liberals
and progressives. It has generally been framed as a critique of recent
Supreme Court decisions, particularly those that have served conservative interests.12 The underlying assumption behind much of the scholarship on popular constitutionalism is that the Supreme Court, at least in
recent years and perhaps as a general rule, is more conservative than the
populace.13 Therefore a more democratically responsive constitutional
system, a system in which popular claims on the Constitution play a
larger role, would generally serve the causes of most concern for liberals
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”). The seminal articulation of this principle, prominently referenced in all these recent cases, is Cooper v. Aaron.
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming the Supreme Court to be “supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution”).
10. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 223.
11. See, e.g., id. at 228–32.
12. Much of the momentum for popular constitutionalism as a scholarly movement derived
from (1) the Rehnquist Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), see, e.g., KRAMER,
supra note 2, at 231; Kramer, supra note 2, at 153; and (2) the Rehnquist Court’s limitations on
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases such as Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637–38 (1999); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
524; see, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel,
Juricentric Restrictions]; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 441–42.
13. Kramer, supra note 2, at 130–31.
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and progressives—most notably the promotion of various human rights
causes.14
So the Tea Party’s emergence presents something of a dilemma.
Here we have a movement that seems to be doing much of what popular
constitutionalists have been calling for. It is claiming independent interpretive authority over the Constitution. It is finding ways in which to act
upon its constitutional claims that do not depend upon the courts. Yet the
central claim on the Constitution that the Tea Party has embraced is a
commitment to sharply limited government. The Tea Party vision of the
Constitution is in direct opposition to the idea of the Constitution as a
vehicle for the protection of civil rights and social welfare rights that has
been at the heart of the popular constitutional project within the legal
academy. If this is popular constitutionalism, might it require a reconsideration of some of the assumptions that have driven scholarship on popular constitutionalism?
In this Article, I consider the lessons that the Tea Party offers for
scholars of popular constitutionalism. Specifically, I argue that the experience of the Tea Party should spark a reconsideration of some assumptions that tend to drive much of the interest in popular constitutionalism.
Some who have embraced popular constitutionalism seem to assume that
popular constitutional mobilization is a vehicle particularly well suited
for advancing progressive constitutional claims. Alternately, some have
assumed that popular constitutionalism has no particular ideological or
partisan valence—that it is basically a neutral vehicle for advancing constitution claims of all kinds. But the lessons of the Tea Party might require a rethinking of these assumptions. The Tea Party has shown that, at
least on the modern American scene, popular constitutional mobilization
is particularly effective at advancing causes much closer to the heart of
the conservative or libertarian agenda. Part of the explanation for this has
to do with the nature of constitutionalism as well as cultural assumptions
prevalent in recent American history. But, more importantly, it has to do
14. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 181 (defining “populist constitutionalism” as centered
on the promotion of human rights);
In a recent string of decisions invalidating federal civil rights legislation, the Supreme
Court has repeated the simple but powerful message: ‘The Constitution belongs to the
courts’. . . . These decisions break with the judicial practice of the last half century, when
the Court employed doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitutional interpretation, defining the scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight
to Congress’s judgments about the nation’s needs and interests. No longer does the Court
emphasize the respect due to the constitutional judgments of a coequal and democratically elected branch of government. Now it claims that only the judiciary can define the
meaning of the Constitution.
Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 1. Most of the historically oriented works
on popular constitutionalism have focused on moments in which popular movements advocated for
the expansion of federal authority in the name of promoting social welfare and civil rights. See
KRAMER, supra note 2, at 220; cf. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should
Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 887 (2005) (suggesting that “Kramer sees popular constitutionalism only when he approves of the cause”).
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with the mechanism available for popular constitutional mobilization.
These mechanisms serve certain causes better than others, and they serve
demands for less government regulation particularly well. This, I suggest, has been the central lesson of the Tea Party for popular constitutionalism.
In Part I of this Article, I examine the basic project of popular constitutionalism, including its normative implications. I explore the challenges popular constitutionalists have had in defining their central concept, and I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism that
identifies what is unique about efforts of constitutional mobilization (as
differentiated from social movements that lead to constitutional change).
Part II describes the basic tenets of Tea Party constitutionalism. Here I
explore the substance of the Tea Party’s constitutional vision, the strategies of constitutional interpretation the Tea Party has embraced, and the
predominantly extrajudicial processes by which the Tea Party has sought
to advance its reading of the Constitution. Part III then considers whether
popular constitutionalism advances certain claims on the Constitution
better than others. Drawing on the lessons of the Tea Party, I look at
those mechanisms that have proven particularly effective at mobilizing
and advancing popular constitutional claims, and I question how different kinds of claims might be advanced through these mechanisms. I suggest that there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that popular
constitutionalism may be most effective when it is used to advance a
conservative-libertarian agenda, such as that of the Tea Party.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM DEFINED
A. The Fundamentals of Popular Constitutionalism
The great contribution of popular constitutionalism scholarship has
been to draw our attention to the ideas and commitments of extrajudicial
actors on questions of constitutional meaning. By challenging the idea
that the Supreme Court is the only—or even the preeminent—
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, popular constitutionalism
provides a more accurate description of American constitutional development. This is popular constitutionalism as a descriptive claim.
There is also a normative component to much of popular constitutional scholarship. For some popular constitutionalists, a better appreciation of the importance of the constitutional commitments of the American people and a more skeptical attitude toward the idea of judicial interpretive supremacy points toward an alternative framework for arguing
how the constitutional system should work. Extrajudicial inputs are not
only a fact of life in the American constitutional system, but, according
to some advocates of popular constitutionalism, we are better off because
of it. We should encourage more popular engagement with the Constitution and its history. Taking this one step further (and here is the most
controversial element of popular constitutionalism), some advocates of
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popular constitutionalism argue that the courts should do more to recognize and respect extrajudicial constitutional commitments, even when
they diverge from judicially defined constitutional law.15 In this critique
of judicial interpretive supremacy, popular constitutional scholarship
points toward a normative theory of judicial decision-making. On questions of constitutional interpretation, judges should view themselves in a
dialogue with the people and their elected representatives. Some scholars
have gone so far as to suggest that the proper attitude of the courts should
be one of deference to certain extrajudicial claims on the Constitution.
B. A Working Definition of Popular Constitutionalism
A central challenge in defining popular constitutionalism is to locate
something distinctly “constitutional” about social movements that engage in a variety of issues. Simply because a social movement claims
that its agenda is supported or inspired by the Constitution or by constitutional principles cannot be enough to turn a social movement into a
popular constitutional movement. Or, if this is enough, then the concept
of popular constitutionalism has little to no analytical utility.
Drawing on the work of several leading scholars in the field, in this
section I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism. My goal
here is not to come up with a categorical framework that conclusively
identifies one movement as being properly a popular constitutional
movement and another as outside the definition. Such an approach
would be of limited utility. Rather, I undertake this definitional project so
as to offer a framework by which we can compare different movements
in terms most relevant to popular constitutional analysis. The concept, as
I define it, is best understood as residing on a two-dimensional spectrum,
with one axis representing the “popular” component of the movement,
the other representing the “constitutional” component.
The relative “popularity” of a constitutional movement does not reference its level of popular support. Rather, it looks at the movement’s
relationship to the courts, particularly the Supreme Court. A movement
that acts in ways that are largely autonomous from the courts and judicial
doctrine would score highly on this scale. A movement that is more deferential to judicial interpretive authority on constitutional questions, such
as a litigation-centered movement whose primary mission is to convince
the Court to rule a certain way in a constitutional case, would score
poorly.
Understood this way, then, a basic component of popular constitutionalism is some level of assumed interpretive autonomy from the judiciary. While a broad-based campaign aimed specifically at convincing
15. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12; Post & Siegel, Equal
Protection, supra note 4.
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the justices of the Supreme Court to chart a new path of constitutional
interpretation is a constitutional movement of a sort, it does not quite
capture the essence of popular constitutionalism, at least as that concept
has been developed over the past decade or so.16 For such an approach
would seem to grant to the courts the interpretive authority that is rightly
that of the activists. The critical actors in this scenario are lawyers and
judges, not the people themselves. In contrast, popular constitutionalism,
according to Kramer, “does not assume that authoritative legal interpretation can take place only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally
valid process of interpretation can be undertaken in the political branches
and by the community at large.”17 Kramer, for one, has dismissed the
popular constitutional bona fides of most contenders to this label of the
past fifty years because they tend to frame their constitutional arguments
as challenges “directed at rather than against the Court.”18
I would argue that popular constitutionalism must contain a selfconscious move that is at the center of legal analysis: an effort to make a
distinction between law from politics. Specifically, for purposes of defining a popular constitutional movement, an extrajudicial constitutional
claim must include some effort to distinguish constitutionality from political or moral advisability—it must at least recognize the possibility that
there is a difference between the decision of what makes good or just
policy and the measure of a given policy’s constitutional status.19 In formulating their visions of popular constitutionalism, both Mark Tushnet
and Larry Kramer have identified some recognition of the law-politics
16. But see Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1029 (“In contrast to
Kramer, we do not understand judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually
exclusive systems of constitutional ordering.”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 351 (2001) (“A look at
our constitutional history suggests that judicial supremacy is, in important respects, a collaborative
practice, involving the Court in partnerships with the representative branches and the People themselves.”).
17. Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006).
18. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 221; see also Kramer, supra note 17, at 698 n.3 (arguing that
recent anti-abortion activism has accepted the principle of judicial supremacy because the state-level
legislative restrictions on abortions these activists have advanced have been designed not as assertions of “co-equal authority to say what the Constitution means,” but as a way to get the Court to
revisit its prior holding in Roe).
19. A common criticism of the theory of popular constitutionalism is that it is impossible to
distinguish it from social and political activism generally. For example, James Fleming has written:
All of Kramer’s historical examples of popular constitutionalism provide answers to the
question of who may interpret—and involve rejection of claims that courts rather than
other departments or the people themselves are the ultimate or exclusive interpreters of
the Constitution. None of them gives us any idea of what is the content of the constitutionalism in popular constitutionalism and how it binds and guides the people themselves.
Thus, it is not clear that there is any particular content to popular constitutionalism that
constrains the people themselves . . . . The upshot of all this is that it is not clear that there
is a domain of popular constitutionalism as distinguished from the domains of ordinary
politics and justice.
James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously
Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2005) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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divide as a necessary attribute of the concept.20 In Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, Tushnet insisted that his version of popular
constitutionalism (which he labeled “populist constitutional law”) must
be understood as a legal concept.21
The most problematic term here is law. How can constitution decisions made away from the courts, particularly by ordinary citizens, be
law? . . . [I]t is law because it is not in the first instance either the expression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression
22
of unfiltered moral judgments.

Kramer further develops the point: “[P]opular constitutionalism is
not mere politics, but is in fact a legal concept that treats the Constitution
as ‘law’ in its proper sense.”23 The key distinction between law and politics is a sense that law “binds and limits” in ways that politics does not:
“The law itself encumbers the field of available action.” 24 The extent of
this constraint is less important than a basic assumption “that applying
law differs from doing politics because it includes constraints that do no
exist in the political domain.”25
If we put together these two necessary components of popular constitutionalism—an assumption that constitutional principles function
differently from policy and a measure of autonomy from the courts—
then it becomes clear that popular constitutionalism is best considered on
a spectrum. This spectrum would have on one end an exclusively
“juricentric”26 or “legal constitutionalist”27 or “catholic”28 approach to
constitutional interpretation, which would include reform efforts aimed
exclusively at constitutional litigation. On the other end would be popular constitutionalism in its purest form—popular movements that mobilize around constitutional interpretations that either act as if the Supreme
Court is irrelevant or act in direct opposition to existing constitutional
20. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x–xi; Kramer, supra note 17, at 699.
21. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x.
22. Id. at x–xi. Tushnet adds that while he identifies “populist constitutionalism” as a legal
concept, it still “accords a large place for politics, in two senses: Populist constitutional law gains its
content from discussions among the people in ordinary political forums, and political leaders play a
significant role in assisting the people [who] conduct those discussions.” Id. at xi.
23. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 699–700; see also KRAMER, supra note 2, at 30 (describing eighteenth-century
constitutionalism, which serves as a model for Kramer’s concept of popular constitutionalism, as
“self-consciously legal in nature,” albeit with a “notion of legality [that] was less rigid and more
diffuse [than modern conceptions]—more will willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over competing plausible interpretations of the constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea as unfocused as ‘the people’”).
26. Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 2 (“The juricentric Constitution
imagines the judiciary as the exclusive guardian of the Constitution.”).
27. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699 (distinguishing “popular constitutionalism” from “legal
constitutionalism,” defined as “the idea that constitutional interpretation has been turned over to the
judiciary and, in particular, the Supreme Court”).
28. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27–30 (1988).
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doctrine (with any modification of that doctrine only an incidental or
secondary goal of the constitutional mobilization).
II. TEA PARTY CONSTITUTIONALISM29
Part II breaks down the elements of the Tea Party as a constitutional
movement. I first offer a brief summary of the emergence of the Tea
Party movement. Then I examine the core tenets of Tea Party constitutionalism. I give particular attention to the ways in which the Tea Party’s
ideas about how best to interpret the Constitution provide a platform for
constitution mobilization. I then describe the major areas of activism and
mobilization for the Tea Party’s constitutional project.
A. The Emergence of the Tea Party Movement
The Tea Party was born in early 2009, when a series of scattered
rallies denouncing the Obama Administration’s stimulus program (a continuation and expansion of policy begun under the Bush Administration),
coalesced into a loosely organized national movement flying the banner
of the “Tea Party.”30 (This name always harkened back to the revolutionary protest against British authority, but in the early stages of the movement some supporters also promoted it as an acronym for “Taxed
Enough Already.”) The Tea Party gained media attention with nationwide protest rallies on tax day, April 15, 2009.31 It was not clear at this
point whether this was going to be a flash in the pan, a brief flurry of
anger before people got back to their lives, or whether it had the potential
for something more sustained.
By the following summer, with the Tea Party still gaining adherents
and energy, its potential political force was put on display when the
movement aimed its attention on President Obama’s health care reform.32
Local Tea Party groups, encouraged and guided by a number of national
organizations that sought to capture and direct the energy of this growing
movement, organized protests at town hall meetings members of Congress were holding around the country to discuss the pending health care
legislation.33 Health care provided a convenient and effective focal point
for the second wave of Tea Party activism. When Congress went into its
summer recess in August, many of its members held town hall meetings
to talk to their constituents.34 Tea Party leaders targeted these meetings
as a way for the Tea Party to get itself heard. As one leader explained in
29. The following section draws on material examined at considerably more lenth in Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. (forthcoming,
2011).
30. Liz Robbins, Protesters Air Views on Government Spending at Tax Day Tea Parties
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A16.
31. Id.
32. KATE ZERNIKE, BOILING MAD: INSIDE TEA PARTY AMERICA 83 (2010).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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a strategic memo, Tea Partiers should follow the lessons of Chicagobased community organizer Saul Alinksy: “freeze it, attack it, personalize it, and polarize it.”35 There were two objectives at these meetings: to
challenge the Representative and to draw the audience’s attention to the
fact that the Democratic leadership “is acting against our founders’ principles.”36 Tea Partiers indeed attended these meetings in full force, often
using disruptive tactics.37
September 12, 2009, saw the largest round of Tea Party rallies yet.
These were organized in large part by FreedomWorks, a libertarian organization that has aligned itself with the Tea Party, and Glenn Beck, who
was launching what he called a “9–12” project.38
In 2010, the Tea Party emerged a major force on the national political scene. The year began with Scott Brown’s dramatic victory, on January 19, in the special election in Massachusetts to fill the senate seat of
Edward Kennedy.39 Massachusetts showed the Tea Party’s ability to
bring together grassroots activism and big-money support. The Brown
victory foreshadowed the power of the Tea Party as a player in the midterm elections the following fall. In the coming months, Tea Partybacked candidates would produce numerous upsets in the Republican
primaries, and a number of them would go on to win in the November
elections.40
Although early critics of the Tea Party dismissed it as a an artificial
movement, as “Astroturf,” as a movement with powerful backers but
without real grassroots support, by 2010, the reality that this was a grassroots movement with widespread support became increasingly difficult
to deny.41 Time magazine reported in February 2010: “Across the country, from Muskegon, Mich., to Wetumpka, Ala., Tea Party meetings are
being convened in restaurants and living rooms and libraries and office
buildings—and online. Tea Party thinking has inspired hundreds of websites and Facebook pages.”42 By the spring of 2010, polls found almost
one in five Americans identifying themselves as supporting the Tea
Party, with four percent of the population saying they had given money
to a Tea Party group or attended a Tea Party event.43 Exit polling at the
November 2010 mid-term congressional elections found forty percent of
35. Id.
36. Id. at 83–84.
37. Id. at 84–85.
38. See id. at 24–25, 85.
39. Id. at 88–92.
40. Alex Altman, Primary Round-Up: A Tea Party Triumph (Or Two) Is a Win For Dems,
TIME, Sept. 15, 2010.
41. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 4.
42. David von Drehle, Why the Tea Party Movement Matters, TIME, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1964903,00.html.
43. Kate Zernike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More
Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at A1 (summarizing a New York Times/CBS News poll).
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those who cast their votes saying they were sympathetic to the Tea Party
movement.44 The Tea Party closed 2010 by making the short list for Time
magazine’s “Person of the Year.”45
B. The Fundamentals of Tea Party Constitutionalism
Attempting to make sense of the Tea Party is no easy task. Although
there are a few national Tea Party-affiliated organizations,46 and a number of national figures who are identified with the movement,47 the Tea
Party has been largely driven by local groups that have popped up around
the country over the past two years.48 Because of its decentralized organization, under its umbrella is a diverse collection of interests and agendas. The Tea Party, like any broad-based social movement, contains
many contradictions. Nonetheless, when one focuses on the Tea Party’s
attitude toward the Constitution, a relatively coherent constitutional vision emerges.
Tea Party constitutionalism revolves around four fundamental assumptions. The first is that the solutions to the problems facing the
United States today can be found in the words of the Constitution and the
insights of its framers. The Founding period was a special moment, never
to be replicated—the Founders were perhaps even divinely inspired. As
Tea Party-backed candidate for U.S. Senate, Christine O’Donnell explained in a speech: “When our country’s on the wrong track, we search
back to our first covenant, our founding documents, and the bold and
inspired values on which they were based.”49
The second fundamental assumption is that the meaning of the Constitution and the lessons of history are readily accessible to American
citizens who take the time to educate themselves. The Tea Party rejects
hierarchical assumptions about authoritative constitutional interpretation
in favor of more individualistic or community-based, decentralized ap44. Fox Hannity (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 4, 2011).
45. David von Drehle, 2010 Time Person of the Year Runner-Up: Tea Party, T IME , Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037118_2037102,00.html;
see also TODAY Viewers Want Chilean Miners to Win TIME Title, TODAY (Dec. 10, 2010, 3:37
PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/40609817/ns/today-today_celebrates_2010/#.
46. The most prominent of these include: Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Nation, and FreedomWorks. Various local groups, such as the Chicago-based Sam Adams Alliance, have gained a
level of national prominence. The Tea Party Express, which is basically a conservative Republican
fund-raising group that targets certain electoral races, has also gain considerable influence. And
there are also various political action committees—such as the Koch-backed Americans for Prosperity, that have effectively tapped into the Tea Party fervor. See von Drehle, supra note 44.
47. Glenn Beck is perhaps the most prominent single individual associated with the Tea Party.
Other significant figures include Sarah Palin, Ron Paul, and Michelle Bachmann. See Lydia DePillis,
The Tea Party Glossary: Everything You Need to Know About the Movement, From Nuts to Nuts,
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-tea-party-glossary.
48. The Rise of the Tea Party, THE WEEK (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:36 AM),
http://theweek.com/article/index/106173/the-rise-of-the-tea-party.
49. Christine O’Donnell, Speech at the 2010 Values Voter Summit (Sept. 16, 2010), available
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/17/christine-odonnell_n_721382.html.
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proaches. Tea Party constitutionalism is premised on a commitment to
citizen empowerment. “Because YOU are the Government” reads the
motto of the Independence Caucus, a Utah-based group that has circulated a list of questions designed to be given to potential candidates for
public office that tests their commitment to conservative constitutionalism.50 A foundational premise of Tea Party constitutionalism is that individual citizens can read the document for themselves, come to conclusions about constitutional meaning based on this reading, and act upon
these convictions.
The corollary of this belief in the accessibility of the Constitution,
and the third basic assumption of the Tea Party’s constitution vision, is a
commitment to the idea that all Americans, not just lawyers and judges,
have a responsibility to understand the Constitution and to act faithfully
toward it. The Constitution is accessible. As Dick Armey, former House
Majority leader and now Chairman of FreedomWorks, likes to tell audiences: “If you don’t understand the Constitution, I’ll buy you a dictionary.”51 A popular Tea Party bumper sticker reads: “I have this crazy idea
that the Constitution actually means something.”52 One of the most notable aspects of Tea Party constitutionalism is the relatively minor place
the Tea Party allows for the courts in discussing constitutional issues.
The preferred battleground for the Tea Party’s project of constitutional
reconstruction is not the courts.53 Rather, the Tea Party has made its efforts in the area of educational outreach, state-level political mobilization, and national electoral politics.
The fourth fundamental tenet of Tea Party constitutionalism involves the movement’s substantive idea of what the Constitution actually
means. At the heart of the Tea Party’s vision is a belief that the overarching purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that the role of government,
and particularly the federal government, is limited. Only by following
constitutionally defined constraints on government can individual liberties be preserved. In the words of Tea Party favorite Senator Rand Paul
of Kentucky, “belief in self-reliance, limited government and the Consti-

50. INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.ourcaucus.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
51. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 67; see also ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE RULING CLASS:
HOW THEY CORRUPTED AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN D O ABOUT I T 44 (2010) (all that is needed to
understand the meaning of the Constitution is “the dictionary and grammar book”).
52. Political Bumper Stickers, LIBERTY STICKERS, http://www.libertystickers.com/product/
I_have_crazy_idea_the_constitution_MB (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
53. The relative inattention to the courts reflects a general sense among Tea Party supporters
that the Supreme Court is simply not on their side. See, e.g., CODEVILLA, supra note 50, at 42–43
(attacking the courts as having a “[d]isregard for the text of laws, for the dictionary definition of
words and the intentions of those who wrote them” and enforcing a “Constitution imagined by the
judge and supported by the ruling class”); MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA 32 (2005).
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tution hold the keys to fixing our problems and getting our nation back
on track.”54
Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer neatly summarizes
the assumptions underlying Tea Party constitutionalism:
What originalism is to jurisprudence, constitutionalism is to governance: a call for restraint rooted in constitutional text. Constitutionalism as a political philosophy represents a reformed, self-regulating
conservatism that bases its call for minimalist government—for reining in the willfulness of presidents and legislatures—in the words
and meaning of the Constitution. . . . In choosing to focus on a majestic document that bears both study and recitation, the reformed conservatism of the Obama era has found itself not just a symbol but an
55
anchor.

Here are all the basic elements of the Tea Party’s constitutional vision:
the Constitution as a framework for “minimalist government”; the Constitution invites individual “study and recitation”; the Constitution’s
“words and meaning” are self-evident; the Constitution as “an anchor”
holding the nation fast to its founding principles.
C. Constitutional Interpretation as Social Mobilization
Tea Party constitutionalism has also coalesced around a particular
method of constitutional interpretation, namely originalism. This is a
notable development because the most prominent arguments in defense
of originalism have emphasized the ways in which it supposedly constrains judges. Originalism, this argument goes, relies upon tools of constitutional analysis that are particularly suited to judges. It insulates
judges from relying upon their own value judgments when interpreting
the Constitution better than any other interpretive approach. Yet the version of populist originalism that the Tea Party has embraced has detached the case for originalism from concerns with judicial restraint. For
the Tea Party, originalism is a tool of extrajudicial constitutional mobilization.
Radio show host Mark Levin in his 2009 best-seller, Liberty and
Tyranny, lays out the basic case for originalism as a tenet of movement
conservatism:
The Conservative is an originalist, for he believes that much like a
contract, the Constitution sets forth certain terms and conditions for
governing that hold the same meaning today as they did yesterday
and should tomorrow. It connects one generation to the next by restraining the present generation from societal experimentation and
54. Rand Paul, Rand Paul, Libertarian? Not Quite, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2010, 6:13 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-10-column10_ST2_N.htm.
55. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed, Constitutionalism, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at A19.
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government excess. There really is no other standard by which the
Constitution can be interpreted without abandoning its underlying
56
principles altogether.

In various forms, this basic defense of originalism as an act of national
fidelity and a call to arms echoes throughout the Tea Party movement.
The Constitution “meant one thing when it was written, and it still means
the same thing,” declared a speaker at an April 2009 Tea Party rally in
Athens, Texas.57 “It’s up to us to light a fire under our fellow citizens.”58
Perhaps no major figure of the Tea Party has done more to insist
that the Founders must be at the forefront of contemporary policy discussions than Glenn Beck. “In order to restore our country,” he has said,
“we have to restore the men who founded it on certain principles to the
rightful place in our national psyche.”59 Beck has called for a “Refounding.”60 The Beck-inspired “9–12 Project” has identified nine principles
for its followers, each supported with a quotation from Jefferson or
Washington.61 The group also calls on its followers to meet regularly
with family and neighbors to discuss the importance of the Founders’
design for America.62 “When you read these guys [the Founders], it’s
alive,” Beck once said on his show. “It’s like, you know, reading the
scriptures. It’s like reading the Bible. It is alive today. And it only comes
alive when you need it.”63
This last point—that the Founders and the Constitution they drafted
is “alive today”—is central to Tea Party ideology.64 For the Tea Party,
the Founders’ ideas and personalities are present with us today. Their
portraits, their words, even their modern avatars (in the form of historical
re-enactors) are regularly found at Tea Party events. The Founders are
also generally portrayed as comfortable companions. They are not only
admirable and likable, but they also tend to agree with the Tea Party.65
56. MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 36 (2009).
57. Lauren Ricks, Anyone for T.E.A.?: 300 Gather at County Courthouse to Protest More
Taxes, ATHENS DAILY REV., Apr. 16, 2009, available at Westlaw ATHENSDLY.
58. Id. “I came because I want our country restored to our founding principles,” explained an
attendee at the rally. Id.
59. JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY’S REVOLUTION AND THE
BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY 156 (2010) (quoting The Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television
broadcast Apr. 30, 2010)).
60. Glenn Beck Reveals the Plan, GLENN BECK (Nov 26, 2009, 3:19 AM),
http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/198/33398.
61. 9 Principles, 12 Values, THE 9-12 PROJECT, http://the912-project.com/about/the-9principles-12-values/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
62. Our Mission, THE 9-12 PROJECT, http://www.the912project.com/2009/03/24/missionstatement-2/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
63. LEPORE, supra note 59, at 157 (quoting The Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television
broadcast May 7, 2010)).
64. See Adam Liptak, Tea-ing Up the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at WK1.
65. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Tea Party Choice Scrambles in Taking on Reid in Nevada,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1 (writing that Sharron Angle, in response to Harry Reid’s criticism
that she was too conservative, suggested that “they probably said that about Thomas Jefferson and
George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. And truly, when you look at the Constitution and our
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Furthermore, the Founders, by most Tea Party accounts, were in basic
agreement on the key points. The Founders were remarkable not only for
the force of their ideas, but also for their general agreement upon these
ideas. “One of the most amazing aspects of the American story,” wrote
W. Cleon Skousen, the late ultra-conservative conspiracy theorist whose
work has become widely influential in the Tea Party,66 “is that, while the
nation’s Founders came from widely divergent backgrounds, their fundamental beliefs were virtually identical.”67
Thus we can see in the Tea Party the transformation of originalism
from a method of constitutional interpretation whose primary attribute
was its claimed ability to limit judges into a method of constitutional
interpretation that has become a focal point for a movement that has
largely ignored the courts in promulgating its various constitutional
claims. Originalism in its populist form has become an act of respect,
even reverence, for the Founding generation. Populist originalists emphasize the accessibility of Founding Era history, offering clear and consistent answers to the most pressing dilemmas of modern America. This
may not be good history, but it offers a powerful tool for constitutional
mobilization.
D. The Process of Constitutional Mobilization
One of the most important contributions of the Tea Party movement
for scholars of popular constitutionalism is that it has demonstrated the
viability of various extrajudicial mechanisms of popular constitutional
claim-making.68 In this section, I examine the mechanisms by which the
Tea Party has sought to inject its constitutional vision into popular consciousness and political practice. I categorize these mechanisms into
three categories: (1) the Tea Party’s promotion of its constitutional vision
through educational outreach efforts; (2) state-level Tea Party activism,
including lobbying for state “sovereignty” and nullification measures;
and (3) national electoral politics, particularly the 2010 congressional
elections, which provided the Tea Party a platform for pursuing its constitutional vision through the electoral process.
founding fathers and their writings . . . you might draw those conclusions: That they were conservative. They were fiscally conservative and socially conservative”).
66. On Skousen’s influential role in the Tea Party, see generally Sean Wilentz, Confounding
Fathers: The Tea Party’s Cold War Roots, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2010; see also Jeffrey Rosen,
Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 26, 2010, at 34.
67. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA: THE MEANING AND SUBSTANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 10 (1985).
68. Various commentators have noted that the popular constitutionalists have been short on
concrete descriptions of “the particular institutional mechanisms that would make their vision a
reality in today’s world.” David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006); see also David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2049–50 (2010); Todd E. Pettys, Popular
Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
313, 321 (2008).
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1. Educational Outreach
Premised on the idea that the Constitution is a document that is
readily accessible to all Americans and a belief that higher levels of constitutional consciousness will naturally support their cause, national and
local Tea Party groups have sought to promote constitutional literacy
among the citizenry. “We need to talk about and learn about the Constitution daily,” said Jeff Luecke, a Tea Party organizer from Dubuque,
Iowa, expressing a commonplace sentiment among the Tea Party faithful.69 Glenn Beck regularly rails against the lack of schooling about the
Constitution,70 and he has called on his listeners to act as a “constitutional watchdog for America.”71 “Only citizens’ understanding of and
commitment to law can possibly reverse the patent disregard for the
Constitution and statutes that has permeated American life,” writes
Angelo Codevilla, the author of a widely discussed recent populist conservative manifesto.72 One Tea Party-affiliated campaign—called “Save
the Constitution—Read It!”—promotes a six-point constitutional commitment plan:
1. Commit to reading the Constitution today and reviewing it often.
2. Make a goal and write it down.
3. Mark your calendar to review the Constitution on the 17th of each
month.
4. Tell a friend about your goal.
5. Better yet, read it with a friend.
6. Place pocket Constitutions in your car or near your favorite
73
chair.

The Tea Party Patriots sell an “Official Tea Party Patriots’ Coloring &
Activity Book” for children.74 According to their website, “[i]nspired by
the principles of Freedom and Liberty immortalized in the United States
Constitution . . . the book includes a simple and fun emphasis on funda-

69. Philip Rucker & Krissah Thompson, Two New Rules Will Give Constitution a Starring
Role in GOP-Controlled House, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2010, 10:57 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/29/AR2010122901402.html.
70. See Bradford Plumer, The Revisionaries, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2010, at 16.
71. Ian Millhiser, Rally ‘Round the True Constitution’, AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 25, 2009,
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=rally_round_the_true_constitution.
72. CODEVILLA, supra note 51, at 84.
73. Commit, SAVE THE CONSTITUTION READ IT!, http://www.saveitreadit.org./page/ commit.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
74. Coloring Book, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/coloringbook.aspx
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
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mental freedoms and is part of a long term effort to educate the next generation of children on the basics of American liberty.”75
Tea Party activists often compare their constitution classes to
Catholic catechism76 or Bible study.77 They often proudly carry copies of
the Constitution, and pocket copies are regularly distributed at Tea Party
events.78 A group called Let Freedom Ring holds public readings of the
Constitution,79 and some Tea Party groups have requested opportunities
to go into schools to talk about the Constitution.80
2. State-Level Constitutional Mobilization
The second category of constitutional activity is state-level mobilization. This has included campaigns to get state legislatures to pass “sovereignty resolutions”—statements asserting a commitment to the principle of state sovereignty as recognized in the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution.81 Some states have even gone so far as to declare the right
to nullify federal policy that the state legislature deems unconstitutional.82 Another element of state-level constitutional activism is efforts
to mobilize support for certain Tea Party-favored amendments to the
Constitution.
The mobilization of states’ rights ideology and even the possibility
of state nullification of federal policy has been one of the most controversial elements of the Tea Party’s constitutional project. The Tea
Party’s embrace of these state-level projects of resistance to federal policy is significant not only because of the way they align with the movement’s constitutional vision, but also because they provide an arena for
constitutionally driven political mobilization that offers near-term, feasible targets, and the possibility of occasional victories. “We didn’t get
75. Id.
76. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 79.
77. Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69 (describing Beth Mizell, a local Tea Party organizer,
comparing weekend classes on the Constitution to a church Bible study); Jill Lepore, The Commandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 76 (“Many
people are now reading [the Constitution], with earnestness and dedication, often in reading groups
mode[l]ed on Bible study groups.”).
78. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 67; Bill Donahue, The Calling Chuck Henthorn Led Ohio Tea
Partiers to the Glenn Beck Rally: Can Their Vision Of Patriotism—Duty And God's Marching Orders—Reshape America?, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at W09; Mara Liasson, Tea Party: It’s Not
Just
Taxes,
It’s
the
Constitution,
NPR,
(July
14,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128517427; Plumer, supra note 70, at 17.
79. Plumer, supra note 70, at 16.
80. Id.
81. Kathy Kiely, Some States Pass Sovereignty Measures, USA TODAY (May 17, 2009, 5:05
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-05-14-secede_N.htm#; see also The 10th Amendment
Nullification
Movement,
TENTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
82. Jack Kenny, N.H. House Asserts State’s Right to Nullify Federal Laws, THE NEW
AMERICAN (Mar. 31, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/6935nh-house-claims-states-right-to-nullify-federal-laws.
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involved just to scream and shout; we actually have things that we’d like
to accomplish,” explained a local Tea Party activist in Tennessee who
came to his state’s capital to demand that the legislature attend to the Tea
Party’s concerns.83 Even if these campaigns are often dismissed as
merely symbolic, the states nonetheless provide a powerful forum for
ongoing popular mobilization of the Tea Party’s constitutional agenda.
The Tea Party’s promotion of state-level resistance to federal
authority began in a rather haphazard, even farcical manner, but has
since developed into a standard element of its larger constitutional project. Texas governor Rick Perry gained headlines when, at a Tea Party
rally in the spring of 2009, he went so far as to suggest secession as a
possible remedy for an overreaching federal government.84 As talk of
Texas seceding from the union died down, a basic pattern of Tea Party
mobilization in the state legislatures developed. The first step was a
round of generic “state sovereignty” resolutions. A popular model resolution has been promoted by the Tenth Amendment Center: the nonbinding “10th Amendment Resolution.”85 It includes some rather prosaic
Tea Partyesque rhetoric—a statement that sovereignty resides in the people, not the government; the text of the Tenth Amendment; a reference to
unnamed federal “powers, too numerous to list for the purposes of this
resolution, [which] . . . infringe on the sovereignty of the people of this
state” and may be unconstitutional.86 It also includes some stronger language—a demand that the federal government “cease and desist any and
all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated powers”; a resolution to form a committee “to recommend and propose legislation which would have the effect of nullifying specific federal laws and
regulations”; a call for the creation of a “committee of correspondence”
to rally support for these principles in other states.87
The next step of the Tea Party’s state-level constitutional project
has been the passage of state laws aimed at nullifying specific federal
regulatory policies. The primary target here has been the health care law,
although federal policies relating to the regulation of guns and medical
marijuana have also been challenged through nullification resolutions.
Even before passage of the federal health care bill in early 2010, local
Tea Party groups were calling upon their state legislatures to take a stand
against the looming possibility of a national health care program. A
January 2010 rally in Missouri saw numerous state officials expressing
support for an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting enforce83. Cara Kumari, Tea Partiers Tell Lawmakers To Deliver, WSMV (Jan. 12, 2011, 9:40 PM),
http://www.wsmv.com/politics/26471655/detail.html.
84. W. Gardner Selby & Jason Embry, Perry Stands by Secession Idea, Says He Won’t Push
It, A USTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 17, 2009, at A01.
85. 10th
Amendment
Resolution,
TENTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER,
www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/10th-amendment-resolution/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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ment of the individual mandate.88 After the health care bill was signed
into law, several states passed statutes expressing opposition to the law;
some even went so far as to refuse to enforce the law.89 Virginia was the
first to do so, passing its nullification law on March 4, 2010.90 At this
time, thirty-six other states were considering similar legislation.91 These
nullification resolutions were based on a template being circulated by the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), titled the “Freedom of
Choice in Healthcare Act.”92 By the end of 2010, the model legislation
had been introduced or announced in forty-two states; six states (Virginia, Idaho, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri), had passed versions of the bill; and two (Arizona and Oklahoma) had passed the bill as
a constitutional amendment.93 In early 2011, Tennessee passed a law that
would allow residents to choose to opt-out of the health care mandate.94
When it comes to opposing the constitutionality of federal policy,
nullification laws have obvious attractions from a movement mobilization perspective. “Nullification Begins With You,” explains a Tenth
Amendment Center brochure designed to promote its “Nullify Now
Tour.”95
Nullification is not something that requires any decision, statement or
action from any branch of the federal government. Nullification is
not the result of obtaining a favorable court ruling.
....
Nullification is not the petitioning of the federal government to start
doing or to stop doing anything. Nullification doesn’t depend on any

88. THOMAS E. WOODS, N ULLIFICATION: H OW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 122 (2010).
89. Becky Bohrer, Alaska Gov. Refusing to Enact Health Care Law, MSNBC (Feb. 17, 2011,
5:44 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41651066/#.
90. Act of March 10, 2010, ch. 106, 2010 Va. Acts 106 (adding § 38.2-3430.1.1 to the Virginia Code: “No resident of this Commonwealth . . . shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy
of individual insurance coverage . . . . .”) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1.1 (2010)).
91. Chelsey Ledue, Virginia is the First State to Pass National Healthcare Nullification Law,
HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/ virginia-first-state-pass-national-healthcare-nullification-law.
92. ALEC’s Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL,
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Cont
entID=15323 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
93. Id.; see also David Lightman, All Over Map on Health Care, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 22,
2011, at C4.
94. State House Passes Health Freedom Act, THE CHATTANOOGAN.COM (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_196197.asp. The newest state-level tactic being pursued is the creation of an interstate compact that, if it received congressional approval, would exempt member states from participation in the national health care program. See Fred Barnes, Nullifying Obamacare, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com
/articles/nullifying-obamacare_524862.html; The Compact-Health Care Compact, HEALTHCARE
COMPACT, http://www.healthcarecompact.org/compact.
95. Nullifying
Federal
Mandates,
TENTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/brochures/Nullification-Brochure.pdf.
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Federal law being repealed. Nullification does not require permission
96
from any person or institution outside of one’s own State.

One of the constant challenges of constitutional mobilization is
keeping a sense of purpose and forward momentum to the cause. Constitutional change can be so slow, the realization of constitutional goals
often seem impossibly distant. Lobbying state legislatures to stand up for
their Tenth Amendment rights has proven a particularly effective way in
which the Tea Party addressed this challenge.
3. National Politics
The third area of Tea Party constitutional activism I consider takes
place in the arena of national electoral politics. The plan here is straightforward: to make fidelity to the Constitution a central qualification for
elected office. The constitutional principle of limited federal power can
be effectuated simply by demanding that members of Congress recognize
their constitutional responsibilities—and voting them out of office if they
fail to do so. One of the Tea Party’s goals was to transform the elections
into a debate over the appropriate scope of congressional power under
the Constitution. Thus far, it is here, in congressional politics, that the
Tea Party’s constitutional agenda has had its most significant impact.
“It is becoming apparent to millions of voters the solution lies in
electing officials who understand, respect and abide by the Constitution
as much as we citizens are expected to follow the law,” explained longtime conservative fundraiser Richard Viguerie.97 FreedomWorks Chairman Dick Armey’s basic advice to the newly elected Tea Partysupported members of Congress is quite simple:
Look to the Constitution to govern your policy. You do not swear an
oath to the Republican Party or the tea party—your pledge is to defend the Constitution. Let this govern your votes. The Constitution
was designed to limit government power, so make sure your votes go
98
only to bills that are right and necessary.

The Independence Caucus, an organization that describes itself as a
“national citizens organization” and has been aligned with local Tea
Party groups, created a lengthy list of yes-or-no “vetting questions” for
congressional candidates.99 It is basically a test of Tea Party bona fides,
designed to measure a candidate’s commitment to the Independence

96. Id.
97. Richard Viguerie, Constitutionally, the Next Time, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2009, 5:45
AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/23/constitutionally-the-next-time/.
98. Dick Armey, Stay True to Principle — and the Constitution, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2011,
04:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47697.html.
99. See The Process: Vetting Questions, INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.icaucus.org/
vetting-process/the-questions (last visited June 29, 2011).
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Caucus’s mission of promoting limited government, fiscal responsibility,
and “adherence to constitutional authority.”100
Mike Lee, newly elected U.S. Senator from Utah and a Tea Party
favorite, has been quite explicit in talking about the constitutional commitments he, as an elected representative, would feel compelled to follow, regardless of existing judicial doctrine. In a speech to the Federalist
Society in November 2010, soon after his election victory, Lee stated,
that the solution to federal overreach lies in focusing on the political
branches. Members of Congress must take more responsibility for the
Constitution, he explained. They must not forget the fact that
under Article VI, each member of Congress is required to take an
oath to uphold the Constitution. In my mind, that means more than
doing that which you can get away with in court. . . . [M]embers of
Congress need to be held accountable, and need to hold themselves
accountable, to their oath, regardless of what the courts might be
willing to enforce—that that needs to become part of the American
101
political discourse.

When the new Republican House majority was installed in early
2011, one of the most publicized changes was to require that all federal
laws specify the constitutional basis for congressional authority.102 This
was a proposal the Tea party had advocated during the 2010 elections.103
The reason this requirement gained so much traction has much to do with
a moment in the fall of 2009 during the height of the debate over the
federal health care bill. At a press conference held by House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi, a reporter from a conservative news organization asked the
Speaker where in the Constitution she found the basis for the individual
mandate provision of the health care bill.104 “Are you serious? Are you
serious?” she asked.105 When the reporter responded in the affirmative,
she shook her head and moved on to another questioner.106 This confrontation, and Pelosi’s dismissive attitude toward the question of the law’s
100. Mission
Statement,
INDEPENDENCE
CAUCUS,
http://www.icaucus.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=51&Itemid=81 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
101. Senator-Elect Michael S. Lee, Address to 2010 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 19,
2010), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/audioLib/LeeAddress-11-19-10.mp3.
102. See, e.g., Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69.
103. See About Us, CONTRACT FROM AMERICA, http://www.thecontract.org/aboutus (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011). The Contract From America was created by Ryan Hecker, an activist affiliated with the Houston Tea Party Society. The proposal was also included in the Republican Pledge
to America, which the party rolled out during the 2010 elections. Republicans in Congress, A Pledge
to America: A New Governing Agenda Built on the Priorities of our Nation, the Principles We Stand
For, & America’s Founding Values, http://pledge.gop.gov/resources/ library/documents/pledge/apledge-to-america.pdf (“We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause
citing the specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.”).
104. Matt Cover, When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order Americans To Buy Health Insurance, Pelosi Says:’Are You Serious?’, CNSNEWS.COM (Oct. 22, 2009),
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/55971.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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constitutionality, has been referenced again and again in Tea Party literature.107 It is regularly cited as clear evidence that the Democratic leadership was playing fast and loose with the Constitution, ignoring conservative concerns that health care and other measures pushed beyond the
boundaries of Congress’s constitutionally enumerated powers.
The House Tea Party Caucus began a high-profile Constitution
study group, not unlike the ones that have popped up around the nation
with the encouragement of local Tea Party groups. Michelle Bachmann,
U.S. Representative from Minnesota and founder of the Tea Party Caucus, organized a series of what she called “Conservative Constitutional
Seminars” for members of Congress.108 The class became a major news
story before it even began, when Bachmann announced that Justice
Scalia would lead the group’s first meeting.109
There was also the highly publicized reading of the Constitution
from the floor of the House of Representatives at the start of the term of
the 112th Congress—the first time this had ever been done in the history
of the House.110 Republican Congressman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, a
fiscal conservative and staunch opponent of the health care bill,111 initiated the idea. “One of the resounding themes I have heard from my constituents is that Congress should adhere to the Constitution and the finite
list of powers it granted to the federal government,” he said in a press
release.112 “As the written expression of the consent the American people
gave to their government—a consent with restrictions and boundaries—
the public reading of the Constitution will set the tone for the 112th Congress.”113 “Call it the tea party-ization of Congress,” Washington Post
107. See, e.g., CODEVILLA, supra note 51, at 45; WOODS, supra note 88, at 1; Ken Klukowski,
Letter to the Editor, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2009, 05:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1009/28787.html (“Yes, Madame Speaker, I’m serious. The individual mandate is unconstitutional.
If Obamacare passes, we’ll see you in court.”).
108. Justice Scalia to Address Conservative Constitutional Seminar, CONGRESSWOMAN
MICHELE BACHMANN (Dec. 15, 2010), http://bachmann.house.gov/News/ DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=217599; Gabriella Schwarz, Congress To Be Schooled, CNN.COM (Dec. 15,
2010, 11:24 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/15/congress-to-be-schooled-2/#more139906.
109. Editorial, Justice Scalia and the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at WK7; Schwarz,
supra note 108. On January 24, Scalia talked at the seminar. According to reports of some who
attended, Scalia gave his trademark defense of originalism and urged the lawmakers to read the
Federalist Papers and to follow the Constitution as it was written. David G. Savage & Kathleen B.
Hennessey, Scalia Gives Talk on Constitution to Members of House, CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 2011, at
C12.
110. Felicia Sonmez, Constitution Day: House Holds First-Ever Floor Reading of Founding
Document, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/
2011/01/constitution-day-house-to-hold-1.html.
111. As Goodlatte wrote in defending his opposition to the health care bill: “All Americans
should be worried anytime the federal government tries to trample on or ignore our Constitution . . .
.” The Wrong Prescription for America, CONGRESSMAN BOB G OODLATTE (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://goodlatte.house.gov/2010/03/the-wrong-prescription-for-america.shtml.
112. Goodlatte to Lead Historic Reading of U.S. Constitution on House Floor, CONGRESSMAN
BOB GOODLATTE (Jan. 4, 2011, 02:33 PM), http://goodlatte.house.gov/2011/01/goodlatte-to-leadhistoric-reading-of-us-constitution-on-house-floor.shtml.
113. Id.

2011]

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE RIGHT

545

reporters wrote about the newfound congressional fascination with the
Constitution.114 “After handing out pocket-size Constitutions at rallies,
after studying the document article by article and after demanding that
Washington return to its founding principles, tea party activists have
something new to applaud. A pillar of their grass-roots movement will
become a staple in the bureaucracy that governs Congress.”115
By turning to congressional elections and lawmaking as an arena of
constitutional contestation, the Tea Party has found a way in which everyday citizens can stake out constitutional claims and then demand, in a
relatively direct manner, that government abide by these constitutional
principles. This approach to constitutionalism is far more empowering
and far more effective as a tool of movement mobilization than working
through the courts. Although critics often dismiss these Tea Partyinspired episodes and reforms as little more than publicity stunts, they
have been effective at keeping the Tea Party’s constitution claims in the
public eye. The Tea Party has achieved something considerable in creating a viable popular constitutional movement—a movement that has
been able, for the most part, to avoid becoming dependent on the outcomes of constitutional litigation but at the same time has had considerable success in keeping its agenda focused on the Constitution’s text and
its history.
III. LESSONS FROM THE TEA PARTY
In its self-conscious commitment to extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, the Tea Party offers one of the clearest demonstrations of
the dynamics of popular constitutionalism in modern American history.
This still-unfolding movement might offer valuable lessons about the
capacities and limitations of popular constitutional mobilization.
In this section, I will explore one possible lesson that emerges from
the Tea Party case study. The hypothesis I will consider is that (1) popular constitutionalism is better suited to advancing certain kinds of constitutional claims over others, and that (2) the Tea Party experience suggests that popular constitutional mobilization can be particularly effective in advancing the small-government, anti-regulation agenda that is at
the heart of the modern conservative-libertarian movement.
In pursuing this hypothesis, I am challenging an assumption prevalent within popular constitutional scholarship. Scholarship on popular
constitution has had something of a leftward tilt. Most of the most enthusiastic proponents of popular constitutionalism in the legal academy selfidentify as political liberals or progressives.116 They envision popular
114. Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69.
115. Id.
116. This observation is explored in Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?:
Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 86 NOTRE D AME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011),
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engagement with the Constitution as an antidote to a Supreme Court that,
for reasons having to do both with the ideological commitments of particular justices and the institutional constraints of the judiciary, has too
often blocked progressive reforms favored by the elected branches and
by popular movements.117 Popular constitutionalism is thus assumed to
offer an attractive oppositional force to a Supreme Court that today and
perhaps more generally (with the Warren Court as an aberrational moment) is basically a conservative institution. In treating popularly based
constitutional commitments as oppositional to a conservative judiciary,
popular constitutionalists assume that popular constitutional mobilization
is well suited to the kinds of claims favored by progressives. Or, at
minimum, they assume that popular constitutionalism provides ideologically neutral mechanisms through which all kinds of constitution
claims—those favored by progressives as well as those favored by conservatives—can be advanced. The Tea Party experience raises the question of whether unleashing the people themselves as autonomous claimants on constitution meaning results in predictably progressive constitution claims. More provocatively, the Tea Party experience might suggest
that popular constitutionalism could in fact have a rightward tilt. At least
in the modern American scene, it would seem that those mechanisms that
are most readily available for advancing extrajudicial constitutional
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1658549. One need only look at the
contributor list to a volume that emerged from a conference co-sponsored by the American Constitution Society and dedicated to strategizing the advancement of a progressive constitutional vision, to
see the obvious overlap between liberal law professors and the leading proponents of popular constitutionalism and its variants. THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2009). One should not take this point too far, however. While it seems clear that the majority of the
most important advocates of popular constitutionalism (at least in its most recent incarnation) have
been liberal, two qualifications are necessary. First, some of the theory’s most prominent critics are
also liberal. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673 (2004). And some of the most prominent proponents of
variations on the theory of popular constitutionalism are well-known conservatives. Advocacy of
variants of extrajudicial constitutionalism can be traced back to Edwin Meese and are found in the
scholarship of Michael Stokes Paulson and others. Second, popular constitutionalism, as a theory of
constitutional development, does not call for any particular outcome, whether liberal or conservative.
As David Pozen has written:
Popular constitutionalists do not tend to claim that judicial supremacy has diminished social welfare or social justice, though they occasionally draw attention to the Court’s propensity to thwart progressive legislation or to the fragility of constitutional commitments
that lack a grounding in public support. The focus is on process and culture more than
outcomes. As normative theorists, popular constitutionalists have stressed a nonconsequentialist point about the courts’ ability to impede collective self- determination.
Pozen, supra note 1, at 2057.
117. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights
Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994)
(“[A]s the federal judiciary continues roughly on the course set in the 1980s, resuming its historic
role as a largely conservative, sometimes reactionary force in American life, perhaps progressive
constitutional thinkers can do more. The Constitution, after all, was not written solely for courts to
interpret, nor does it mean only what judges say it means. On the contrary, the Constitution often has
been the terrain for broad public debates. And until relatively recently, neither popular nor scholarly
discussion of constitutional matters focused so narrowly on judicial doctrine. For most of United
States history, when politicians, reformers-and scholars-debated the meaning of the Constitution,
they far more often addressed the citizenry and the legislatures than the courts.”).
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claims tend to serve conservative and libertarian interests better than
progressive ones. What follows is a provisional effort to sketch some of
the factors that could be drawn upon to evaluate this claim.
A. The Conservative Constitution
A central factor in considering the possible ideological tilt of popular constitutional mobilization is the nature of the Constitution itself.
Most of the Constitution’s text is quite old. Although the Constitution
can be read many ways, it is, first and foremost, a monument to a vision
of governance from a past era. The “lessons” that can be easily extracted
from this document, extracted without much intermediary direction (such
as judicial doctrine), are not the kinds of lessons that tend to inspire those
on the left today.
“The Framers’ constitution, to a large degree, represented values we
should abhor or at least reject today,” Michael Klarman stated in his
2010 Constitution Day lecture.118 “The Constitution was drafted over 200
years ago by people with very different concerns and values.”119 Not only
is there the obvious point that the original Constitution actively supported the institution of slavery, but there is the point that “the Framers’
constitution was mostly a conservative, aristocratic response to what they
perceived as the excesses of democracy that were overrunning the states
during the 1780s.”120 The Framers were skeptical of democracy, Klarman
emphasizes, and they were fully accepting of limiting the vote to white
male property owners.121 Those provisions that would seem to prevent
the government from doing what a majority of the people believe it
should do are generally stretched or ignored. The idea of enumerated
powers for Congress has largely been pushed aside; the administrative
state is clearly problematic on separation of powers and nondelegation
grounds, but it is here to stay; we now have an “imperial executive” that
is a far cry from what the Founders envisioned for this office.122 “The
Framers would not recognize our system of government today,” explains
Klarman, “yet the idea that courts would strike it down as unconstitutional seems almost inconceivable. The original design of the Constitution has become almost completely irrelevant.”123
This kind of skepticism was the central theme of Justice Thurgood
Marshall’s controversial remarks on the document’s bicentennial:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever
‘fixed’ at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, fore118. Michael Klarman, A Skeptical View of Constitution Worship, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 27,
2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/09/skeptical-view-of-constitution-worship.html.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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sight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights,
we hold as fundamental today. When contemporary Americans cite
‘The Constitution,’ they invoke a concept that is vastly different from
what the Framers barely began to construct two centuries ago.124
It would be hard to find a description of constitutional development more
at odds with the Tea Party movement than Marshall’s. For Marshall, the
Founding Fathers were deeply flawed men, as was the Constitution they
created. “[T]he true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its
life.”125
What is important to note is that Marshall’s speech is that it was a call
for a kind of constitutionalism, but it was a constitutionalism based in a
skepticism toward the original document and the history surrounding the
framing of the document. It sought to demote the centrality of the text
and of the late eighteenth century and to elevate the subsequent history of
struggles to, in Jack Balkin’s phrase, “redeem” the Constitution.126 Not a
miraculous moment in the summer of 1787, but subsequent struggles to
overcome the limitations of the 1787 generation are at the heart of Marshall’s constitutional vision and, more generally, contemporary progressive constitutionalism.
Justice Marshall had faith that his vision of the Constitution—a vision of the Constitution largely detached form its eighteenth century
roots—aligned with that of “contemporary Americans.” But, as demonstrated in opinion polls showing considerable support for originalism and
in the successes of the Tea Party in pushing an originalist conception of
the Constitution, this assumption appears questionable, at least in today’s
political environment. The case of the Tea Party indicates that, at least in
the context of modern American political and constitutional culture,
popular constitutionalism serves insurgent conservatism remarkably
well. Most obviously, insisting, as the Tea Party has done, that the text
and history of the Constitution play a role in debates over federal policy
tends to provide added leverage to those who advocate more limited
government. While resistance to federal regulatory authority can be
found across the political spectrum (consider, for instance, the liberallibertarian alliance that briefly blocked renewal of the Patriot Act in early
2011), it has been the centerpiece of the modern conservative agenda. As
124. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
125. Id. at 5.
126. JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN U NJUST WORLD
(2011).
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a matter of popular constitutional mobilization, demanding that Congress
do less (or that it repeal what it has already done) because of constraints
based in constitutional text and history is a powerful weapon. The unavoidable fact that the federal regulatory state has grown immeasurably
since the nation’s beginning means that the Founding Era contains plenty
of material with which to challenge the proposed policy on originalist
grounds. To insist that the Constitution be a central factor in the debate
has tended to bolster the case of small-government opponents of new
regulations more than its proponents. When it comes to political and social mobilization, the benefits of going constitutional, at least on the
modern American scene, seem to favor the cause of small-government
conservatism.
B. Populist Conservative Constitutionalism—The Historical Record
In using popular constitutional mobilization in the name of limiting
the power of the federal government and mobilizing around states’ rights
principles, the Tea Party locates itself into a venerable tradition dating
back to at least to the period of the American Revolution. Considered
historically, many of the most powerful expressions of popular constitutionalism have been in the service of resistance to federal government
authority.
In delineating this intellectual history of popular constitutionalism,
Kramer identifies the eighteenth-century Anglo-American concept of
“fundamental law” as “law created by the people to regulate and restrain
government, as opposed to ordinary law, which is law enacted by the
government to regulate and restrain the people.”127 Kramer elaborates
that “[t]he object of fundamental law was to regulate public officials,
who were thus in the position of ordinary citizens with respect to it and
required to do their best to ascertain its meaning while going about the
daily business of governing.”128 In defending the newly drafted Constitution against Anti-Federalist charges that it created a national government
that would devour the states, Federalists emphasized the ways in which
the people could protect themselves against federal over-reach.129 In
Federalist No. 46, James Madison famously recognized the importance
of popular mobilization as a mechanism for resisting unconstitutional
encroachments of federal authority.130 When faced with a federal law that
transcends the limits of constitutional authority, states, Madison insisted,
retained considerable ability to mobilize opposition:
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the
127.
128.
129.
130.

KRAMER, supra note 2, at 29.
Id. at 30.
See id. at 83–91.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
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executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions,
would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would
form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would
present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be
willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the
authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition
of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of
general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause.
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be
131
concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.

Many of the most conspicuous episodes of popular constitutional
mobilization in American history have been aimed at standing up against
federal power based on an originalist or fundamentalist reading of the
Constitution.132 This was the case when Jefferson and Madison sought to
mobilize opposition within the states to the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798.133 This was also the case in the lead-up to the Civil War, when the
South argued that the Constitution protected slavery against federal interference, while abolitionists who refused to enforce federal fugitive slave
laws also claimed to be acting on constitutional principle.134
Moving into the twentieth century, we can see a similar pattern of
social and political movements drawing on the text and history of the
Constitution in order to protect against the growth of federal power. The
Constitution became a powerful symbol of what was perceived to be a
simpler and more principled time—it became, in essence, a rallying point
for those who sought to slow the social and political changes of modern
society. In his cultural history of the Constitution, A Machine that Would
Go of Itself, historian Michael Kammen locates the first nationwide effort to mobilize the American people in order to specifically promote and
defend the Constitution as taking shape in the 1910s and continuing
through the 1930s.135 Like today’s Tea Party, this was a movement that
was ideologically conservative, reacting against the trend toward the
centralization of governmental power, increased federal regulations, and
perceived encroachments by governing philosophies that were seen as
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 4, 167 n.10 (noting that prior to the New Deal, the tradition
of the extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, which he terms the “political Constitution,” “focused chiefly on the powers of state versus federal government and on interbranch allocations of
power” and that “[i]ndividual rights arose more rarely as objects of direct congressional interpretation and enforcement”).
133. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528–29, 540–44 (1861).
134. Timothy S. Huebner, Lincoln’s Legacy: Enduring Lessons of Executive Power, 3 ALB. L.
REV. 615, 624 (2010).
135. See MICHAEL K AMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO ITSELF 206–08 (2006).
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dangerous and radical.136 As a speaker at a 1934 Constitution Day celebration proclaimed, the Constitution is “a bulwark against communism
and Fascism.”137 Constitution Day—an observance initiated by various
patriotic groups in the late 1910s—became a regular platform for denunciations of Progressive and then New Deal policy.138 Like the Tea Party,
this movement adopted a quasi-religious language to describe its efforts.
It was a “constitutional revival” that was called for, explained Senator
William E. Borah in 1924.139 This movement sought to increase popular
understanding of the Constitution, sparking the creation of various organizations and citizens clubs, emphasizing constitutional fidelity as a particularly patriotic exercise.140 In the 1920s, members of constitutionalist
groups such as the National Security League, the National Association
for Constitutional Government, the Constitutional League were described
as “Constitution Worshippers” and “Professional Patriots.”141
In the 1950s and 1960s, white southerners opposed to civil rights
also sought to energize popular engagement with the Constitution and the
history of the Founding. In their efforts to oppose Brown v. Board of
Education142 and the possibility of federally mandated school desegregation, southern segregationists took their stand on the Constitution. In
1956 almost all southern members of Congress put their names on a
statement, soon to be known as the “Southern Manifesto,” denouncing
Brown as “unwarranted exercise of power by the Court, contrary to the
Constitution.”143
The Founding Fathers gave us a Constitution of checks and balances because they realized the inescapable lesson of history that no
man or group of men can be safely entrusted with unlimited power.
They framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by
amendment in order to secure the fundamentals of government
against the dangers of temporary popular passion or the personal
predilections of public officeholders.
We regard the decisions of the Supreme Court in the school cases
as a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal
Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and
the people.

136. Id.
137. Wall St. Observes Constitution Day, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1924, at 23 (quoting comments
of Professor William B. Guthrie, in a speech sponsored by the National Security League).
138. KAMMEN, supra note 135, at 219–23.
139. Id. at 219; see also id. at 225 (describing the emergence of “a constitutional cult . . . that
manifested strong religious overtones”).
140. Id. at 206–08, 220–21.
141. Id. at 224–25.
142. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
143. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–60 (1956).
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The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither
144
does the 14th Amendment nor any other amendment.

The statement argued that the separate-but-equal principle, having
been “restated time and again, [had become] a part of the life of the people of many of the States and confirmed their habits, traditions, and way
of life.”145 “We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land,” the southern members of Congress wrote in
conclusion.146 “We decry the Supreme Court’s encroachment on the
rights reserved to the States and to the people, contrary to established
law, and to the Constitution.”147 Writing of the advocates of “massive
resistance,” one contemporary observer noted: “In a sense they have become ‘constitutional fundamentalists,’ trying to restore the true faith that
is alleged to have been corrupted by modernism.”148
Extrajudicial claims on the Constitution have been pursued for
causes of all kinds. Nonetheless, as these prominent examples suggest,
efforts to inject constitutionalism into policy debate and to energize a
social movement by highlighting constitutional principles and history
have been particularly successful when pursued those promoting an
agenda of anti-regulation, small government conservatism.
C. Progressive Constitutionalism
The current generation of liberals and progressives has sought to
counter conservative claims on the Constitution’s meaning by offering
their own vision of the Constitution. There are certainly textual bases that
progressives can look to in staking their claims on the Constitution. The
Tea Party reading of the Constitution tends to focus its energies on Article I and the Bill of Rights (particularly the Tenth Amendment). In contrast, a progressive reading of the Constitution tends to focus on what
comes before and after those sections. The Preamble contains what is
easily the most stirring and empowering rhetoric of the Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
149
this Constitution for the United States of America.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Lewis M. Killian, The Purge of an Agitator, 7 SOC. PROBS. 152, 153 (1959). See Powe,
supra note 14, at 866–70, for a discussion of Massive Resistance as fitting the mold of popular
constitutionalism.
149. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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These words provide a powerful platform for claiming the need for
more active government involvement in the lives of the American people, all in the service of “establish[ing] Justice” and “promot[ing] the
general Welfare” and “secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty.”150 These
principles, based in the Declaration of Independence as well as the Preamble, are the essence of what Mark Tushnet calls the “thin Constitution”—the narrative of constitutional meaning that can function in the
extrajudicial realm.151
Rather than demonizing the state as conservative populist constitutional tends to do, progressive constitutionalism, in both its judicial and
extrajudicial forms, tends to embrace a positive vision of government
power. This is a vision of federal power formulated, in tentative terms,
during the period of Radical Reconstruction, then born anew through the
struggles culminating in the New Deal and civil rights movement. It rejects the libertarian belief that liberty and power are invariably competing in a zero-sum game. Instead, progressives identify ways in which
government authority can affirmatively act to protect rights. Government
has the ability, perhaps even the constitutional responsibility, to uproot
entrenched inequalities and ensure certain minimum benefits for its citizens without which freedom is impossible.152 Progressive popular constitutionalism occurs when people mobilize around a vision of human
equality and social justice, and do so in the name of fundamental principles contained in our Constitution and embodied in the nation’s ongoing
struggle to form a “more perfect union.”153 As Robin West has written,
“Only by reconceptualizing the Constitution as a source of inspiration
and guidance for legislation, rather than a superstructural constraint on
adjudication, can we make good on its richly progressive promise.”154
150.
151.
152.

Id.
See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 9.
See, e.g., Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 116, at 89 (calling for an “understanding of the state as under a
moral duty, a legal duty, and a constitutional duty to act in the interest of all, and not just a prohibition against acting in certain discriminatory ways”). This distinction between classical and modern
liberal constitutional visions is nicely captured in Justice Jackson’s famous opinion in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part
of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on
officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb selfconfidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few controls and
only the mildest supervision over men’s affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil
in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.
319 U.S. 624, 639–40 (1943).
153. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
708–10 (1990).
154. Id. at 651; see Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine,
84 CHI.-K ENT L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2006).
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William Forbath, one of the most powerful advocates of this constitutional vision, has traced the development of what he calls the “social
citizenship tradition.”155 In contrast to the more commonly recognized
court-centered egalitarian tradition based on Brown and its progeny, the
social citizenship tradition “was a majoritarian tradition, addressing its
arguments to lawmakers and citizens, not to courts. Aimed against harsh
class inequalities, it centered on decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic independence and democracy.”156
Forbath explains, “In public political discourse, New Dealers cast the
changes they sought as fundamental rights reinvigorating the Constitution’s promise of equal citizenship by reinterpreting it.”157 What Forbath
calls the “political Constitution”—in contrast to the “judicial Constitution”—was debated in Congress, in the executive branch, and in the public sphere, with the courts playing little role.158
On the hustings, in radio addresses, and in more sustained debates,
speeches, and writings, the lawmakers and the president argued not
simply that Congress had the power under the Constitution, rightly
understood or amended, to regulate agriculture, industry, and labor.
They argued that citizens had fundamental economic and social
rights under the Constitution, rightly understood or amended; and
Congress, therefore, had the duty to exercise its power to govern economic and social life in a way that sought to secure those rights. . . .
[T]he “social citizenship” tradition . . . . provided them not only a
rights rhetoric, but also a constitutional narrative, modes of interpre159
tation, and conceptions of the allocation of interpretive authority.

The central institution for institutionalizing this constitutional vision, what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the “general Welfare
Constitution,”160 was Congress. “[T]he New Dealers carried forward a
long tradition of congressional constitutional argument, interpretation,
rights recognition, and precedent-making.”161
Not only do progressive legal scholars identify quite different substantive rights in the Constitution than do Tea Party constitutionalists,
favoring most substantive visions of the equal protection principle and
emphasizing the constitutional bases for active government involvement
in advancing social welfare and justice, but the basic vision of the Constitution they tend to advance is in direct opposition to the Tea Party’s
vision of the Constitution. The Tea Party rallies around a vision of the
155. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
156. Id.
157. Forbath, supra note 4, at 182.
158. Id. at 167; see Robin West, supra note 152, at 79–91 (differentiating the “legislated Constitution” from the “adjudicated Constitution”).
159. Forbath, supra note 4, at 176 (emphasis added).
160. Forbath, supra note 155, at 69.
161. Forbath, supra note 4, at 167.
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Constitution as fundamentally a source of limits on government authority, as a bulwark against evolving standards of proper governance, as a
way to keep the present-day Americans in touch with certain basic truths
about liberty identified by a heroic generation of founding Americans.
Progressive constitutionalists question each of these suppositions. They
locate within the Constitution sources of government authority. They
insist that constitutions have never been nor should they be static embodiments of a single past moment. They note that there have been heroic struggles over constitutional principles since 1787 that should also
be part of our constitutional self-understanding. This is a living, responsive, democratic conception of constitutional development. “Constitutional politics involves reinterpreting and revising our fundamental
commitments and arriving anew at considered popular judgments about
the rights of citizens and the duties of government,” Forbath explains.162
While the progressive claims about the core meaning of the Constitution are diametrically opposed to the Tea Party’s claims, there are interesting parallels between the two constitutional projects. Indeed, in
many ways they are mirror images of one another. Each challenges, in
quite profound ways, the constitutional status quo. Each looks to past
moments in American history as offering guidance for achieving their
constitutional vision. Each sees the courts as basically antagonistic to
their constitutional vision. Each takes seriously the value of extrajudicial
constitutional engagement and interpretation. Each identifies Congress in
particular as the institutional focal point for their constitutional projects.
Thus we can see a good deal of overlap between Tea Party constitutionalism and modern progressive constitutionalism, both in terms of tactics
of constitutional mobilization and assumptions about the construction of
constitutional meaning. Both take seriously the constitutional responsibilities of Congress. Both recognize that members of Congress have an
obligation to interpret the Constitution, without being necessarily constrained by judicial interpretation.
In response to the Tea Party’s war for the Constitution, progressive
legal scholars have fought back. Much of the counter-offensive has come
in the form of taking issue with the Tea Party’s reading of the Constitution and claims about its history.163 “The Constitution belongs to all of

162. Id. at 176; see Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 374 (“[T]raditions of popular engagement
. . . authorize citizens to make claims about the Constitution’s meaning and to oppose their government—through constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil society—
when they believe that it is not respecting the Constitution. Government officials, in turn, both resist
and respond to these citizen claims. These complex patterns of exchange have historically shaped the
meaning of our Constitution.”).
163. See LEPORE, supra note 59, at 96–97; Sean Wilentz, Confounding Fathers: The Tea
Party’s Cold War Roots, THE N EW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2010, at 32; David H. Gans, Rand Paul, the
Tea Party, and Our Constitution, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, (May 21, 2010),
http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1696; Plumer, supra note 70.
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us,” writes Garrett Epps.164 “It’s time to take it back from those who are
trying to steal it in plain sight.”165 Epps is critical of liberals for being
unable or unwilling to deal with the Constitution in terms that resonate
with the American people. “Scholars from top schools hold forth with
polysyllabic theories of hermeneutics that ordinary citizens can’t
fathom.”166 Conservatives, on the other hand, “don’t hesitate to speak
directly to the public and, often, to dumb down the Constitution.”167 Yet,
Epps contends that the Constitution is not a conservative document. He
finds “precious little evidence” that the Constitution “was set up to restrain the federal government.”168 “[T]he document as a whole is much
more concerned with what the government can do—not with what it
can’t. . . . [T]he Constitution allowed for a government adequate to the
challenges facing a modern nation.”169 Those limits on government
power that the Constitution does include, he argues “are mostly limits on
state governments and corresponding increases in federal power.”170 By
Epps’ reckoning, “a careful reading of the Constitution” shows that the
framers “wrote a document that in essence says, ‘Work it out.’”171
Epps proposes to fight the Tea Party on their own terms. “To save
our Constitution, we have to read it”—something he believes few people
take the time to do.172 He even becomes something of a cheerleader for
the document and the experience of reading it:
The Constitution as a whole takes effort to read; but once one puts in
the effort—several readings, all the way through, and some serious
thought about what one has read—it reveals a surprising, indeed
sometimes dazzling, array of meanings. By turns political, legal, epic
and poetic, it shows us a number of strategies for dealing with contemporary challenges.
....
At its most basic level, reading the Constitution requires the tools
that Vladimir Nabokov urged readers to bring to any text: imagination, memory, a dictionary and a willingness to use all three when the
173
going gets tough.

And he concludes his attack on the Tea Party with a call to arms:

164. Garrett Epps, Stealing the Constitution, THE NATION
http://www.thenation.com/article/157904/stealing-constitution.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Read the Constitution and measure it against the absurd claims we
hear every day. This is a matter of life and death for our Republic.
We won’t find the Tea Party manifesto there; nor will we find the
agenda of progressive advocacy groups. What we will find is a set of
political tools and a language that fair-minded citizens, progressive or
conservative, can use to talk through our disagreements.
....
Ordinary Americans love the Constitution at least as much as farright ideologues. It's our Constitution too.
It’s time to take it back.

174

The question for progressives like Epps who put their hopes in
popular constitutional engagement is whether the principles of the thin
Constitution can be effectively mobilized. Whether accurate or not, his
description of the revelations to be found in the Constitution is hardly the
kind of call to arms offered by the Tea Party. The only clear message
Epps pulls from the text of the Constitution is that the Tea Party is wrong
in its reading of the Constitution. But the best alternative he has for the
Tea Party’s libertarian constitutional vision is a call for talk. “Work it
out” is hardly a rallying cry for a constitutional movement.
CONCLUSION
The question is, then, are certain constitutional arguments more sustainable in a popular arena? More specifically, is popular constitutionalism more effective—at least in our contemporary political climate—at
advancing a conservative-libertarian agenda than a progressive one? The
experience of the Tea Party suggests that this might very well be the
case. One of the central issues that scholars of popular constitutionalism
are going to have to assess in the wake of the emergence of the Tea Party
is whether popular constitutionalism has an ideological tilt. This question has not been a central focus in scholarship on popular constitutionalism, but it deserves to be.
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